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For the contemporary feminist movement, the 1960s was a decade of emergence 
and development and the 1970s was a decade of vitality, progress, and diversification. 
The 1980s, however, can be understood a s  a decade of retrenchment and survival. In 
1981 the newly elected Reagan administration initiated sweeping economic, political and 
social changes that reflected the power and desires of the New Right. At the heart of this 
h a g a n  administration - New Right alliance was a sharp assault against the feminist 
movement. In this paper, I explore how feminist -social movement organizations (FSMOs) 
-responded to New Right attacks during the period 1980-1987; attacks designed to shut. 
down these organizations and ultimately end the movement. 
This battle between feminist organizations and the New Right may be understood 
within a larger context that concerns defining, promoting and securing differing 
conceptions of justice. Both forces offered to the American public substantially different 
visions of what society ought to look like in terms of gender roles, family structure, and 
moral authority. And in their competing quests, considerable conflict was evident in 
various legislative bodies, the courts, and on the streets. This conflict has not abated and 
depending on the issue, such as abortion rights, the conflict has intensified and seems 
unresolrable. 
According to Hunter the "term 'New Right' refers both to that sensibility and to 
.the organizational network that draws on it while giving it strategic focus and ideological 
coherence. . . . While today it is antifeminist and conservative sexual issues that most 
define the New Right's outlook, racism was central to its emergence and remains crucial 
for overall appeal" (1981: 116). Prominent New Right organizations include Phyllis 
1. The research was funded, in part, by the Program on Conflict Management Alternatives at the University of Michigan. 
Portions of this paper were presented at the 1988 ASA Annual Meeting, Sex and Gender Session. 
Schafley's Eagle Forum, the Moral Majority and fundamentalist churches, the National 
Right to Life Committee and the National Conservative Political Action Committee. New 
Right campaigns have embraced anti-busing, anti-communist, anti-sex education, anti- 
ERA, anti-abortion, and anti-gay issues. While the feminist movement advocated 
independence, equality and choice, the New Right movement urged dependence of women 
and children, traditional male authority and fulfillment through predetermined sex roles. 
The New Right assumed the moral high ground with a philosophy premised on both 
economic and social conservatism. Consequently, it views the women's movement as  
narcissistic and self-indulgent; responsible for the erosion of the family and moral decay of 
society. 
It  is obvious that the Reagan - New Right alliance was and is a serious threat to 
the existence and growth of the feminist movement. What is not clear is how feminist 
social movement organizations coped with this threat and what the consequences of 
various coping strategies were in terms of organizational development. Analyzing FSMO 
- New Right interactions speaks to the larger issue of movement - countermovement 
dynamics. Understanding how FSMOs responded to hostile forces sheds light on how 
movement organizations in general change in order to manage or control their 
environments. 
In this paper, I entertain the possibility that the existence of an opposition is a 
necessary element for successful mobilization (Gerlach and Hines, 1970; Freeman, 1977). 
Moreover, under certain circumstances encounters with the opposition can have a 
radicalizing effect on the movement organization (Ash, 1972), which would be indicated by 
an increased use of revolutionary ideology or militant tactics, decentralization, and/or 
collectivization. This notion of organizational change is in contrast with the traditional 
view that transformation occurs in a conservative direction through such processes as  
bureaucratization, cooptation, professionalization and oligarchization (McCarthy and Zald, 
1977; Michels, 1949; Selznick, 1949; Weber, 1947). 
The goal of this paper is not only to describe encounters with the New Right, but 
also to explain the variations in and consequences of FSMO responses. I also will 
speculate as to why some FSMOs radicalize while others do not. I should stress that this 
analysis rests solely on New Right-FSMO interactions, and I recognize that other factors 
not related to the opposition could account for organizational change. The paper proceeds 
as  follows: an overview of the methodology used and a brief description of the FSMOs in 
this study, a discussion of right wing threats and FSMO responses, an analysis of the 
different types of FSMO response, and finally, an attempt to link these responses with 
organizational dynamics. This piece is part of a larger research project on FSMO survival 
and change during the 1980s. 
Description of FSMOs 
My analysis is based on case studies of nine FSMOs - three National Organization 
for Women (NOW) chapters, three health centers, and three anti-violence crisis centers. 
These three types of organizations reflect the key feminist submovements of the 1970s: 
ERA ratification, reproductive rights, and eliminating violence against women. The 
FSMOs vary by region2, size, servicelaction emphasis, structure, year founded3, and the 
type of experiences with the New Right. None are from the major centers of the 
movement - Boston, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, or Los Angeles. While each offers 
something special to its community, in many ways they can be seen as "typical" feminist 
organizations. 
Data, collected during one week visits, consists of organizational materials (e.g. by- 
laws, grants, meeting minutes, budgets, pamphlets and publicity flyers, staff reports) and 
interviews with past and current participants (32 interviews in the nine organizations). I 
2. Regional designations are based on the National Coalition Against Sexual Assault regions. Northeast: Connecticut, 
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York. Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont; Southeast: 
Delaware, D.C., Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina. Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia; Mid-West: 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan. Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin; South. 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana. Mississippi, Missouri; Northwest: Alaska, Idaho, Montana. Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, Wyoming; Southwest: Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii. Nevada. New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pacific 
Territories, Texas. 
3. Year founded are clustered so that 1970-73 is early 1970s; 1974-76 is mid-1970s. and 1977-79 is late 1970s. 
was interested in gathering evidence that would not just establish trends in organizational 
transformation, but also the reasons for such changes. 
Table A presents a summary of these organizations along selected characteristics 
(year founded, number of current participants, main activities from 1980-87), New Right 
activities a s  reported by the FSMO, and FSMO responses and changes. 
- Table A here - 
I will not discuss the table in detail, but will share some general impressions of what I call 
"feminist life in the trenches". 
All but two of the participants interviewed defined their organization as  feminist4. 
Definitions were grounded largely in the provision of woman-centered services and 
activities; though a number also noted the existence of a clear feminist ideology, the 
process of empowerment of women, and participation in a revolutionary movement. All 
agreed that survival had been the main task for the 1980s; that expansion was a luxury. 
There is little chance that the need for their programs and services will diminish, let alone 
die out, in the foreseeable future. Interviews and organizational materials indicate that if 
possible, FSMO offerings could be expanded and the needs still would not be met. This 
continual demand from the community may help explain the determination to overcome 
obstacles (such as  too few resources) and to maintain focus on their objectives throughout 
this time period. 
Threats by the New Right 
I have clustered the threatening activities of the New Right, as experienced and 
reported by the nine FSMOs, into three broad categories: funding, legislative, and direct 
action. I will conclude this section with some general comments on the climate of anxiety 
and defensiveness generated by the New Right. 
4. Two women did not see their organizations as feminist. One, from the Southwest Health Center, said she couldn't speak 
for other participants and didn't know if everyone who worked there was feminist. The other, from the South NOW, 
focused her definition on process, and since the chapter was not run collectively, she did not believe it to be feminist. 
A major way in which the New Right-Reagan alliance challenged and damaged 
FSMOs was through funding withdrawl. Within the first year of the Reagan 
administration, key federal programs were drastically cut or eliminated. Of particular 
consequence to all of the FSMOs with staff was the elimination of CETA and Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) grants. All of the FSMOs, except the 
Midwest and South NOW chapters, had and lost CETA workers during 1980 and 1981. 
LEAA money was especially important to the survival of anti-violence groups. All three of 
these groups lost this federal money, and the Northeast Center closed during most of 1981 
to plan a new course of action. Additionally, there were state-level New Right initiatives 
such as  a sweeping tax reduction measure that dramatically effected the Southwest Health 
Center. The tax reduction combined with the election of conservative county 
commissioners resulted in the loss of county money from 1980-82. All FSMOs reported a 
general anti-service sentiment that made public fundraising difficult. 
Legislative activities of the New Right concern those issues that shape or influence 
the legal status of women. Based on this research, they are subdivided further into: anti- 
ERA drives, anti-choice legislation and anti-gay legislation. The anti-ERA drives, which 
occurred until 1982, included both efforts to rescind the ERA in ratified states and to block 
ratification in unratified states. The ERA failed by three states and was contested hotly 
until the bitter end. Anti-ERA drives had implications for all three NOW chapters. The 
passage of anti-choice legislation centered on two key issues. One was medicaid abortion 
bans, which had ramifications for the Midwest NOW, the Midwest Health Center and the 
South Health Center. The other was restrictive ordinances against the operation of 
abortion clinics, which involved the South NOW chapter. In addition, the countless Human 
Life and Family Protection measures promoted during Reagan's first term elicited 
response from all of the FSMOs. The final legislative arena, anti-gay rights, centered on 
employment discrimination and on AIDS related treatment and prevention. Local and 
state anti-gay employment bills generated responses from the Northwest NOW chapter. 
Homophobic anti-education measures concerning AIDS had implications for all three health 
clinics. 
The third, and most virulent, form of right wing activity was direct action 
campaigns against abortion clinics. In every community I visited at least one family 
planning or women's clinic had been harassed. The Midwest and South Health Clinics 
experienced directly the actions of right-to-lifers. The Midwest Clinic was picketed on a 
regular basis during 1982 and annually on the anniversary of Roe v. Wade. These 
picketers harassed and "counselled" patients, prevented them from parking near the clinic, 
and drove up and down the street with a bullhorn condemning the workers and patients as  
sinners. The South Clinic withstood severe harassment. During most of 1985 and 1986 
the clinic was picketed daily. Protesters usually numbered 50 but on some occasions close 
to 200. These picketers harassed patients by verbally badgering, physically intimidating 
and taking pictures of them. They blocked access to the clinic through sit-ins. The clinic 
was vandalized and invasions were attempted. Their satellite clinic received bomb threats. 
This FSMO was targeted for closure by the formidable right-to-life leader, Joseph 
Scheidler. 
It is clear that these FSMOs experienced a wide range of assaults from the New 
Right with the most concentrated activity in the south. What should also be evident, but 
more difficult to document, was the climate generated by New Right activities. Through 
tactics of fear and intimidation, combined with often highly emotional pleas for support, 
the New Right set the feminist movement on the defensive. It legitimated or reinforced 
other pockets of conservatism in these communities, such as the medical establishment, 
which in turn also opposed the FSMOs. Both the direct and indirect measures of the New 
Right created an environment hostile to the survival, let alone growth, of FSMOs. 
FSMO Responses 
FSMO responses to these New Right threats ranged from inactivity to highly 
creative and aggressive counter-attacks. All of the FSMOs attended and sponsored rallies 
and educational forums on such issues as reproductive rights (particularly access to safe 
and legal abortions), ERA ratification, and consequences of domestic budget cuts. Through 
newsletters, membership letters and newspaper articles, these organizations alerted and 
urged their constituencies to oppose such administrative actions as  the Human Life 
Amendment, the Family Protection Act, Parental Notification of Minors, elimination of 
family planning funds, the Robert Bork nomination, and mandatory AIDS testing. These 
were often well orchestrated initiatives that connected the FSMO with other community 
groups and agencies. In the following discussion, however, I focus on the specific FSMO 
responses to the right wing threats presented in the previous section. 
The first cluster of right wing threats, funding withdrawl, had implications for all 
organizations in that resource acquisitioi on all levels and in all sectors became 
increasingly difficult. With respect to federal cuts. FSMOs were neither able to replace 
CETA funded people nor were they able to hire those women into permanent staff 
positions. It  took 2-4 years to generate enough resources to fill these positions. The 
elimination of LEAA monies had specific consequences for the three anti-violence groups. 
Both the Southeast and Southwest Crisis Centers saw "the writing on the wall" when they 
learned in early 1980 that their grants would not be renewed. They successfully sought 
state and some private monies to fill the gap and froze all hiring for several years. These 
achievements, however, were predicated on a noticeable shift in board and administration 
orientation. Both centers developed boards of directors with strong business and 
mainstream community agency ties. Both directors (hired in 1984) came from social 
welfare administration, not feminist movement, backgrounds. The outcomes have been 
positive in terms of fundraising and the continuation of high quality services, yet there are 
few linkages with the grassroots feminist communities. 
The Northeast Crisis Center had a phoenix-like response to the LEAA cuts. While 
the shelter was closed, volunteers operated a hotline and safe homes network. During this 
time period, center volunteers worked with the town council and convinced them that a 
shelter was needed. The result was a successful application for.HUD money. The town 
purchased and renovated a house, and leases it to the center for $1 per year. 
Relationships between the town council, the police department and the center are quite 
good, largely due to this planning procedure. Since many of the town council's decisions 
are influenced by the town meeting process, the center was able to undertake community 
education programs that also have generated public support. This demonstrated ability to 
plan resulted in other grants, especially from the state and the local United Way (which 
has taken a remarkably hands-off approach to the center). Currently the center has a 
funding base composed of over 20 sources. The center also maintained its ties with the 
feminist community and is viewed as a leading feminist organization in the area. 
The Southwest Clinic responded to its right wing induced funding cuts with staff 
layoffs and detailed discussions on clinic closing options. This financial crisis added fuel to 
fire that the center should move away from its collective structure and hire an 
administrator. This argument was based largely on the need for race and class diversity, 
but many participants came to believe that improved financial accountability also would be 
achieved by changing from a collective to a democratically managed organization. In 1984 
the center hired an administrator with a specific understanding of fundraising. Fiscal 
planning has been achieved, and in the interim, county funds restored. The center still 
struggles, however, with cash flow problems. 
Second are the legislative battles which primarily involved the three NOW 
chapters. All three NOW chapters participated in ERA activities until 1982 (when the 
ratification deadline passed). Yet the degree of involvement signals important differences 
between the chapters. The least involved was the Midwest NOW, which limited its 
activities to ERA walkathons (sending the proceeds to national) and to letter writing 
campaigns. While this chapter was in a ratified state there were opportunities to work in 
a key unratified neighboring state. However, few mobilization efforts occurred. Such is 
not the case with the South and Northwest chapters, the former from a "written off" 
unratified state and the latter from a ratified state. These chapters also held letter writing 
campaigns and walkathons. Additionally, the Northwest NOW sponsored fundraisers for 
the ERA missionary campaign, provided much of the expenses for two chapter members to 
work in Oklahoma and North Dakota, and sponsored a delegation to go to the Countdown 
Rally in Oklahoma. The South NOW actively participated in mobilization efforts in a key 
unratified neighboring state through local coordination of boycott efforts and through the 
organization of weekend teams that went to the state to canvas for support, establish and 
conduct phone banks; and coordinate rallies and fundraising efforts. In both chapters 
these activities resulted in the creation of an activist-oriented core that would guide the 
chapters in future actions. 
The minimal response of the Midwest NOW chapter extended to mobilization 
efforts against measures to eliminate medicaid funding for abortions. In the Midwest 
state, right-to-life groups successfully ran a petition drive in 1987 to end Medicaid funded 
abortions. A coalition of pro-choice groups responded with a counter-petition drive. 
Midwest NOW participated in coalition activities to gather petitions, but there is no 
indication that they initiated organizing efforts beyond gathering signatures. 
Medicaid abortion bans also elicited action from the South and Midwest Health 
clinics. Because low income women did not have access to affordable abortions these 
clinics were faced with service provision and resource acquisition dilemmas (in that 
Medicaid would have subsidized their services). The South Clinic chose to raise abortion 
fees and add clinics in the hopes of generating more revenue that could support a sliding 
scale. The Midwest clinic5 did raise their fees slightly, mostly to keep up with inflation. 
They also instituted a sliding scale, a loan program, a "hardship" case program (that 
offered free abortions to 1-2 clients a week), and are now investigating community 
5. To show how everything is intertwined, at the time when the medicaid cuts began to hurt the clinic's operations and 
service availability the clinic also noticed an increase in farm women seeking abortions. These women would have been 
more likely not to abort if the farm economy was not failing. 
fundraising options to help assist low-income women receive abortion and gynecological 
care. Much of the money to support this came from their salary and benefit pool. 
The other anti-choice measure was in the form of a local ordinance to restrict the 
operations of abortion clinics. The South NOW chapter actively engaged in this battle 
during 1983. In concert with area family planning centers, this chapter staged rallies, 
held press conferences, organized city council testimony and joined in a lawsuit to block the 
ordinance once it passed city council. Ultimately, the ordinance was struck down in court. 
This organizing further solidified the chapter's activist core. 
The final legislative concern involves gay rights. Northwest NOW was a key 
coalition actor in the defeat of both local and state anti-gay employment referenda. They 
conducted workshops and press conferences, and organized phone banks (a carry over from 
ERA days). Based on this work, they also formed a chapter taskforce on lesbian rights. 
With respect to restrictive AIDS measures, all three health clinics offer low cost HIV 
testing, counselling and education programs. The South Clinic also conducts a Safe Sex 
Party patterned after the tupperware party of old. 
I turn to the final set of right wing activities - direct actions against abortion 
clinics. Since all communities witnessed some form of harassment, all FSMOs had a 
chance to respond. The three anti-violence groups lent moral support to targeted 
organizations but did not engage in public actions. The Midwest NOW chapter donated a 
little money for security and wrote newsletter articles condemning the clinic picketing and 
arson, but did not actively assist the clinics. The Southwest Health Center was spared 
any direct confrontations because they do not offer abortions. They did help with counter- 
protests and escort services on behalf of other area clinics targeted by right to lifers. The 
Northwest NOW also participated in escort services and rallies, and organized fundraisers 
for an area clinic that had been firebombed. This chapter served as a key mobilization 
center in the community. 
The two clinics that were directly attacked, the South Health Clinic and the 
Midwest Health Clinic, organized their own defense actions with the assistance of 
community groups, volunteers, and staffs significant others. Both FSMOs developed 
escort services that arranged to meet patients a few blocks from the clinic and either drive 
or walk with them to the clinic. Patients were informed, a t  the time they made their 
appointments, that picketers would be present. Rallies were held on behalf of the clinics. 
In addition, the South Health Clinic purchased around the clock security, attempted to get 
an injunction against the protesters, filed law suits, and organized counter rallies. I t  
surveyed patients to determine the conduct and impact of the picketers and kept a detailed 
log of the activities in the event of future litigation. It also held staff support groups and 
massage sessions in an attempt to lessen the anxiety. The cost to the clinic was high. The 
director estimates that $150,000 was spent in 1985 on legal and security fees. More 
difficult to document are the emotional costs. Staff were constantly anxious and often 
afraid to come to work. Rather than mobilizing the staff, the picketers wore them down. 
Turnover was and is high a t  the clinic. In an attempt to gain support from the 
mainstream parts of the community, the clinic emphasized a professional, medical image 
and went so far a s  to remodel to look like a traditional doctor's office and not a women's 
self-help center. Yet it was unable to get assistance from the medical and much of the 
legal communities because they were allied with the right-to-lifers. 
Special attention needs to be paid to the responses of the South NOW chapter to 
clinic harassment in their own and in nearby communities. The South NOW chapter 
became involved in clinic protection during 1984 and 1985. Family planning clinics in the 
city frequently were picketed and bomb or arson.threats repeatedly were made. In 
response to these activities, the chapter organized a patient escort service. They utilized 
an old anti-civil rights ordinance that prohibited more than six protesters a t  any given time 
and also forbade singing and dancing during picketing to their advantage. Calling 
themselves the Ladies Lawn Chair Brigade, the NOW chapter received permission to 
picnic on clinic property. If more than six right-to-lifers picketed, if they sang, or if they 
stopped moving, NOW chapter members would remind them of the ordinance and then call 
the police. When a patient arrived, a NOW member would go to her car, explain what 
was happening and accompany her inside. Eventually the opposition broke. This NOW 
chapter also responded to a clinic in a neighboring city which was bombed, invaded, and 
often had 300 protesters show up in attempts to close it down. They organized counter- 
pickets, conducted safety workshops for staff, and co-founded a multi-state coalition that 
tracked militant right-to-life activity. While the protests continue, the clinic attributes its 
ability to remain open to the activities of this chapter. 
As you can see, FSMO responses to New Right threats are quite varied. In this 
next section, I group the FSMOs by type of response and offer explanations for this 
clustering. I conclude with some notions concerning the impact of these responses on 
FSMO transformation. 
Types of FSMO Responses to the New Right 
Four types of responses emerge from this particular set of New Right - FSMO 
interactions. The first is minimal or no response in which the FSMO fails to use the 
presence of the New Right to mobilize on behalf of itself or other endangered community 
groups. This type of response suggests disintegration or stagnation of the FSMO. The 
second response is survival through agency development. Here the FSMO chooses to 
survive by bolstering its service delivery characteristics a t  the expense of its political or 
educational traits. Often this is accompanied by appeals to and identification with 
mainstream community agents. Such a survival response reflects a conservative change 
scenerio. The third type of response is survival through the protection of the grassroots base. 
Under this response type the FSMO may accommodate certain bureaucratic features. But -
it maintains a commitment to its political, educational, and/or egalitarian goals while it 
simultaneously attempts continuation of services. In these FSMOs both radical and 
conservative change can occur on different organizational dimensions during the same time 
period (e.g. the ideology may radicalize while the structure conservatizes). The final 
response type is proactive mobilization in which the FSMO seizes the opportunity to 
confront the right wing. Such action is often done on behalf of other community 
organizations under attack. As a result of confrontations with the right wing, these 
FSMOs experience radicalization. Table B presents these four response types and places 
the nine FSMOs in the appropriate category. 
- Table B here - 
In applying these types of responses to the nine FSMOs, I first consider those that 
provide services - the crisis centers and health clinics. Three of these - the South Health 
Center, the Southwest Crisis Center and the Southeast Crisis Center - survived by 
emphasizing the service components of their operation (response type 2). Conservative 
change is evident. Oligarchies, particularly in the South Health Center, formed. All three 
directors are primarily fiscal administrators and have little contact with the day to day 
functioning of the organizations. There is an increased reliance on professionals and on the 
"professional delivery of services". Working with clients has assumed an individual 
treatment, rather than collective empowerment, approach. While all three FSMOs have 
community education programs, the programs and the social change content within these 
programs have diminished. As indicated earlier, ties to the community are typically with 
mainstream human service agencies and businesses. While these FSMOs provide high 
quality services, often under extreme duress, a vision of social change is no longer part of 
the organizational fabric. 
In contrast, the other three service FSMOs - the Northeast Crisis Center, the 
Midwest Health Center and the Southwest Health Center - survived by protecting and 
expanding their grassroots base (response type 3). All three groups have maintained 
either a collectively or democratically managed structure with mechanisms for staff and 
client input. Former clients are represented in planning processes and service provision. 
Community education was and is a prominent feature. These FSMOs seek to fulfill their 
social change vision by making their offerings more accessible to a greater number of 
disenfranchised community groups. All three FSMOs are viewed a s  key feminist 
organizations in their community. Nonetheless, they did accommodate some traditional, 
bureaucratic features mostly in the area of fiscal accountability. Directors or 
administrators assumed greater responsibility for financial planning, bookkeeping and 
fundraising. This is most clearly seen in the Northeast Crisis Center where the resource 
base has diversified to include over 20 sources yet the director feels overwhelmed by the 
constant emphasis on funding. All three organizations report a shift in their volunteers' 
orientation from social change to career enhancement and are currently debating whether 
to market their training in this direction. And all three centralized their operations to 
some degree, though it should be emphasized that in contrast to the other service FSMOs 
they are remarkably egalitarian. 
What accounts for these differing responses by the service FSMOs? There appears 
to be little correlation between response type and such characteristics as size or age, or in 
the type or intensity of right wing actions. I argue that the survival response depended on 
how the decision makers of the organization understood, analyzed and conveyed the right 
wing threat. Both sets of FSMOs were concerned with the political nature of the assault 
and with the continuation of services. Yet among the group that survived through agency -
development, the problem analysis emphasized the financial harm imposed by the New 
Right. Right wing actions were seen as  motivated politically and aimed a t  destroying the 
resource base of feminist organizations. In contrast, the other set of FSMOs stressed the 
reactionary ideology of the New Right manifested in a variety of strateges designed to 
eliminate feminism. In their explanations to allies, clients and the general public, these 
organizations downplayed the fiscal constraints in favor of an analysis that underscored 
how the activities of Reagan and the New Right endangered civil liberties, freedom of 
choice, and social change protest. They linked their difficulties with the harassment and 
repression felt by other disempowered groups. Their analysis maintained a political and 
social change emphasis which was incorporated into the survival strategies. 
Turning to the three NOW chapters, we see the extremes represented in their 
responses. The Midwest NOW clearly illustrates the first response type. This group 
largely failed to initiate actions on behalf of itself or other organizations. Most activities 
were in follow-up or advertising capacities. Despite some sharply worded newsletter 
editorials against the Fieagan administration, this chapter was not able 6 recruit 
participants. I t  does not have a good reputation within local feminist or progressive 
circles; such activists go elsewhere to contribute their talents. During this time period its 
membership declined dramatically and currently it is unable to fill half of its officer 
positions. Moreover, its membership is largely on paper, contributing dues but not time. 
It is ironic that this chapter was a vital local force in the 1970s and birthed a number of 
feminist organizations that now enjoy greater success. 
In contrast the Northwest and South NOW chapters actively sought confrontation 
with the New Right. Such confrontation resulted in the radicalization of both chapters, 
which is most clearly seen in the increased militancy of rhetoric and strategies. Both 
chapters, but particularly the southern one, were able to establish an activist core that 
continues to fuel and train other participants. Both chapters have decentralized and are 
able to identify and respond to the needs of the community. Through their encounters with 
the right wing, they have gained legitimacy within their communities on a grass roots level 
and now are key coalition actors in numerous local projects. These NOW chapters provide 
excellent case studies supporting the hypotheses that opposition is necessary for movement 
growth and that confrontation is a radicalizing force. 
Why did these two NOW chapters respond differently than the Midwest chapter 
and differently than the service FSMOs? I suggest that the absence of service-dependent 
clients lifts a constraint that might otherwise prevent the pursuit of confrontations. That 
is, those FSMOs that offered services became beholden to their customers for two reasons. 
First, in a competitive market they had to offer what the consumer desired and this at 
times compromised overtly feminist tactics and public actions against the New Right. 
Second, preferred programs and services to fit consumer needs had to be funded. While 
fees for service and donations covered some of the costs, many of these organizations relied 
on institutional or government sources of funding. Thus, they needed to attend to a public 
image that would not "offend" potential donors. Yet that does not explain why the 
Midwest group failed to act when opportunities, albeit rare, presented themselves. Again, 
age and size do not seem to be factors. Clearly the Midwest NOW community did not 
experience the intensity that other communities did, but there was still right wing 
presence. Both the Northwest and South chapters were more successful a t  recruiting and 
inspiring members. Their newsletters indicate continuous and well-focused critiques of the 
h a g a n  administration and the New Right. Thus, membership remained informed as  to 
the activities of the right wing as the opposition was always "in the news". These two 
chapters were also successful in gaining momentum from previous activities and often 
incorporated old strategies and tactics into new campaigns (e.g. the carry over of the phone 
bank). No such consistency is evident with the Midwest NOW. Additionally, its 
community credibility may already have been waning and thus they were never called 
upon nor did activists seek affiliation with them. Finally, the Northeast and South 
chapters were very independent of the national organization, while the Midwest chapter 
did not exhibit such detachment. Thus the more militant chapters emphasized their 
grassroots connection while the other chapter viewed itself as  a local component of a larger 
enterprise. 
One conclusion is that the orientation of the FSMO prior to the 1980s does 
influence its survival responses. A complete analysis would include an assessment of its 
ideology, internal processes, resources, and community niche prior to right wing attacks. 
More difficult to disentangle is the exact relationship between response strategies and 
organizational change. There is ample evidence of organizational transformation. There is 
also evidence for both conservative and radical change hypotheses, involving all or part of 
an organization. But it is not clear precisely what role the New Right had in influencing 
these changes. Clarity is further obscured because the interactions between organiiational 
characteristics are not examined (e.g. how ideology influences strategy), and the cause and 
result are difficult to separate (e.g. did the Southwest Center effectively deal with funding 
cuts because of identification with the mainstream or did this identification come about 
because it needed new funding sources). Measurement of response effectiveness and 
actual change also poses analytical problems. 
To sum, I have described the experiences of nine feminist social movement 
organizations with the New Right during the 1980s. I presented the New Right threats 
and the FSMO responses. I then clustered these responses into four categories: 
minimallno response, survival through agency development; survival through the 
protection of the grassroots base; and proactive mobilization. One possible explanation for 
the clustering of these FSMOs stemmed from the way in which the organization 
understood, analyzed and conveyed the right wing threat. Those FSMOs that focused on 
the political danger posed by the New Right, linked their situations with those of other 
progressive organizations, and achieved local credibility through successful encounters with 
New Right, tended to experience some radicalization. The other FSMOs either stagnated 
or conservatized. A more careful exploration of the links between interaction with the 
opposition and organizational transformation remains a fruitful area of study. Mapping 
the full relationship between threats, responses, and impact will expand our understanding 
of movement-countermovement dynamics and of mobilization capabilities in hostile 
environments. 
Table A: Selected Characteristics of FSMOs 
FSMO Description 
1. Midwest NOW 
- Early '70s 
- Active Core: 7-10 
- Members: 500 
- Chapter peaked in mid 1970s, 
birthing a number of local 
feminist. organizations that still 
serve the community. 
- Educational Forums on women's 
issues. 
- Political Action Committee. 
- Coalition work against state anti- 
choice legislation. 
- Monthly social get-togethers for 
feminist community. 
2. Northwest NOW 
- Early '70s 
- Active Core: 15-20 
- Membership: 700 
- Staff: 1 (pt time) 
- newsletter circulation: 1300 
- Educational forums on women's 
issues. 
- Special attention to violence 
against women and pornography 
issues. 
- Fundraising capabilities match 
the large New York and Los 
Angeles chapters. 
- Supported an office staff person 
for 10 years. 
New Right Activities ResponsesIChanges 
- Anti-ERA legislation - Minimal response: some 
- Anti-choice legislation: medicaid fundraising and support activity. 
abortion ban - No work in unratified state. 
- Picketing and vandalism of local family - Did not initiate pro choice work 
planning clinics - Held educationals, but no direct 
assistance to clinics. 
- Marked membership decline 
since 1983. Currently unable to 
fill half of the officer positions. 
- Little initiative or imaginative 
strategies; indicates stagnation. 
- Funding: CETA cuts - Interns ran office; currently 
- Anti-ERA legislation fundraise to support part time 
- Anti-gay legislation staff. 
- Picketing, vandalism and arson of local - Organized regional phone bank 
family planning clinics. and supported ERA missionaries. 
- Key gay rights coalition member; 
provided phone bank. Established 
lesbian taskforce. 
- Clinic support and some patient 
escort. 
- Fundraising to help rebuild 
fuebombed clinic. 
- Strong taskforce activities 
indicate decentralization process. 
- Participants believe that  chapter 
has radicalized. 
- Ideological statements become 
more militant. 
3. South NOW 
- Late '70s 
- Active core: 8-10 
- Membership: 70 
- Educational forums on women's 
issues. 
- Highly successful voter 
registration drive. 
- Attuned to race and class issues 
in the community. 
- Considered the "only feminist 
game in town". 
- Anti-ERA legislation - ERA ratification campaign in 
- Anti-Choice legislation: clinic ordinance neighboring state. 
- Severe picketing and vandalism against - Organized testimony and press 
family planning clinics in community reports against clinic ordinance. 
and neighboring state - Organized patient escort and 
clinic protection groups. 
- Co-founder of multi-state 
coalition to monitor clinic violence. 
- Moved from Roberts Rules to 
more participatory or consensus 
process. 
- Moved from legislative arena to 
direct action strategies. 
- Taskforce decentralization. 
4. Midwest Health Center 
- Early '70s - Funding: CETA cut 
- Staff: 10 collective members; 5 - Anti-choice legislation: medicaid 
contract workers 
- No board or voiunteers 
abortion ban 
- Anti-gay legislation: restrictive AIDS 
- Self-help, gynecological and measures 
abortion clinics, positive - Picketed and harassed center. 
pregnancy program, massage 
services. Community education 
and outreach. 
- Survived near disaster when 
insurance was lost in 1986 and no 
doctors would assist a t  the clinic. 
- CETA staff not replaced; staff 
downsized. 
- Center supported through 
medical fees .and community 
donations. 
- Actively committed to finding 
solutions for low income women in 
need of services. 
- Provides AIDS screening and 
counselling. 
- Established clinic defense 
protocol (patient notification and 
escort). Co-planned community 
rallies. 
- Still runs as a collective, though 
structure recently modified to 
include part time contract workers 
who are not collective members. 
5. South Health Center 
- Mid '70s 
- st&: 50 
- Board: 6 (includes 3-4 staff 
members) 
- no volunteers 
- Originally a self-help support 
group for women. Developed into 
a comprehensive health center 
with well woman and self help 
clinic, abortion, cervical cap, donor 
insemination and pregnancy 
screening services. Community 
education including AIDS Safe Sex 
Parties. Runs a gynecological 
satellite clinic. 
- Most professionally oriented 
FSMO in study. 
6. Southwest Health Center 
- Mid '70s 
-Staff: 10 
- Board: 10 
- Volunteer: 40 
- Womankind medical clinic, 
cervical cap study program, 
pregnancy screening and 
counselling, fertility awareness 
classes, acupuncture clinic, 
information and referral, speakers 
bureau, INS amnesty exams, 
bilingual outreach program, health 
library and publications project, 
body image and mid-life support 
groups, and health worker 
internship program. 
- Does not offer abortions, but does 
support and refer to clinics that 
- Funding: CETA cut 
- Anti choice legislation: medicaid 
abortion ban 
- Anti gay: restrictive AIDS measures 
- Severe picketing, vandalism and 
harassment of center. 
- CETA staff not replaced; with 
exception small educational 
grants, center is dependent on 
medical fees. 
- Raised medical fees and 
increased revenue generating 
abortion clinics. 
- Low cost AIDS screening; 
educational programs. 
- Established clinic defense 
protocol; installed security system; 
filed law suits. 
- Increased oligarchization with 
founders as management elite. 
- De-emphasized self-help focus. 
- Escalating management-worker 
tension. 
- Staff layoffs. Increased fiscal 
- Funding: CETA cuts; county cuts due accountability with designation of 
to tax reduction administrator to pursue other 
- Anti gay legislation: restrictive AIDS funding options and provide 
measures financial planning. 
- Picketing and harassment of local - Diversified funding base. 
family planning clinics - Provides AIDS screening and 
counselling; works with gay rights 
coalition. 
- Helped with clinic escorts and 
counter demonstrations. 
- In early 1980s, altered collective 
structure in order to diversify and 
become financially solvent. 
- Extensive and increased 
community organizing with 
emphasis on bicultural outreach 
and service provision. 
do. 
- Particular attention to lesbian 
health- issues. 
7. Northeast Crisis Center 
- Late '70s 
- Staff: 5 
- Board: 13 
- Volunteers: 20 
- Multi-purpose center providing 
crisis counselling and shelter for 
victims of domestic violence, 
sexual assault and incest. Also 
provides AA and Al-Anon support 
groups, job readiness services, 
legal and welfare advocacy. Has 
hotline, residential and non- 
residential services. 
- Only rural FSMO, 7% of 
clientele from rural areas. 
- Emphasizes the relationship 
between substance abuse and 
domestic. violence. 
- Only women are staff and board 
members. 
8. Southeast Crisis Center 
- Late '70s 
- Staff: 3 4  
- Board: 25; Advisory Board: 21 
- Volunteers: 150 
- Domestic violence shelter. 
Provides women's support 
counselling, batterers program, 
information and referral, legal 
clinic, legislative advocacy 
program, law enforcement 
training, and community 
education. Programs available for 
both residents and non-residents. 
- As of 1987, all  services housed at  
- F'unding: CETA and LEAA cuts - Closed from mid-1980 to 1981 
- Picketing of local family planning clinic because of federal budget cuts. 
Reopened with the same 
democratically managed 
structures in place. During shut- 
down, operated as a volunteer 
taskforce. 
- Diversified funding base, director 
is basically a grantwriter. 
- Increased community education. 
- Sympathetic but no direct 
involvement on behalf of clinic. 
- Funding: CETA mld LEAA cuts 
- Picketing of local family planning 
clinics 
- Froze hiring and sought other 
funding sources (state and United 
Way). 
- Sympathetic but no direct 
involvement on behalf of clinics. 
- Consolidation of management 
control. 
- Increase in the business 
orientation of the board. There is 
no representative from the 
women's community. Increase to 
the now high degree of 
mainstream community support. 
one site. Shelter no longer kept 
hidden. 
9. Southwest Crisis Center 
- Mid '70s 
- Staff: 6 
- Board: 17; Advisory Comm: 15 
- Volunteers: 100 
- Direct services, hotline and 
counselling, for sexual assault 
victims and their families. Public 
education programs focus on 
causes and elimination of violence, 
especially in dating situations. 
Offers volunteer training 
programs and information-referral. 
- Men hold prominent roles in the 
center, serving on the hotline, 
escorting victims to the hospital, 
counselling families, and directing 
- Funding: CETA and LEAA cuts - Froze hiring and sought other 
- Picketing of local family planning clinic funding sources (state and United 
Way). 
- Sympathetic but no direct 
involvement on behalf of clinic. 
- Consolidation of management 
control. 
- Increase in the business 
orientation of the board. There is 
no representative from the 
women's community. Increase to 
the now high degree of 
mainstream community support. 
public education program. 





2) Survival through 
Agency Development 
South Health Center 
Southwest Crisis Center 
Southeast Crisis Center 
3) Survival through 
Protection of 
Grass Roots Base 
Northeast Crisis Center 
Midwest Health Center 
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